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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 This is an appeal from, inter alia, the District Court’s 
order dismissing the third amended complaint in five cases:  
Collette Davis, et al. v. Abington Memorial Hospital, et al., 
No. 09-cv-05520; Kenneth Lynn, et al. v. Aria Health 
System, et al., No. 09-cv-05548; Kenneth Lynn, et al. v. 
Jefferson Health System, Inc., et al., No. 09-cv-05549; 
Cassandra Ruff, et al. v. Albert Einstein Healthcare Network, 
et al., No. 09-cv-05550; and John Duncheskie, et al. v. 
Temple University Health System, Inc., No. 09-cv-05551.1  
Each of these putative collective and class actions arose from 
the plaintiffs’ allegations that their employers, defendant 
healthcare systems and affiliates (collectively, the 
“defendants”), implemented timekeeping and pay policies 
that failed to compensate them for all hours worked in 
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and 
Pennsylvania law.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
 
                                              
1 The District Court’s order dismissing Susan Frattarola, et al. 
v. Mercy Health System of Southeastern Pennsylvania, et al., 
No. 09-cv-5533, was also appealed, but we subsequently 
dismissed that appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 42(b).  See No. 12-3513. 
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I. 
 
The five cases on appeal are among several similar 
actions brought by a single law firm alleging systemic 
underpayment in the healthcare industry.  The parties are 
nurses and other patient-care professionals, on behalf of a 
putative class, and their alleged employers.  Allegedly, the 
defendants2 maintained three unlawful timekeeping and pay 
policies (collectively, the “Policies”).  First, under the “Meal 
Break Deduction Policy,” the defendants’ timekeeping system 
automatically deducted thirty minutes of pay daily for meal 
breaks without ensuring that the employees actually received 
a break.  Second, under the “Unpaid Pre- and Post-Schedule 
Work Policy,” the defendants prohibited employees from 
recording time worked outside of their scheduled shifts.  
Third, under the “Unpaid Training Policy,” the defendants did 
not pay employees for time spent at “compensable” training 
sessions.  Because of the Policies, the plaintiffs allege that 
they “regularly worked hours both under and in excess of 
[forty] per week and were not paid for all of those hours.”  
Appendix (“App.”) 845, 1469, 1655, 2330–31, 3259.  
 
In November 2009, the plaintiffs filed parallel 
complaints in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania against the defendants,3 asserting 
violations of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.; the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
                                              
2 The defendants are:  (1) Abington Memorial Hospital, 
Abington Health, Abington Memorial Hospital Foundation, 
and Lansdale Hospital; (2) Aria Health System, Aria Health–
Frankford Campus, Aria Health–Torresdale Campus, and 
Aria Health–Bucks County Campus; (3) Jefferson Health 
System, Inc., Thomas Jefferson University Hospitals, Inc., 
Magee Rehabilitation Hospital, and Main Line Health, Inc.; 
(4) Albert Einstein Healthcare Network and Albert Einstein 
Medical Center; (5) Temple University Health System, Inc., 
Temple University Hospital, Inc., Episcopal Hospital, and 
Jeanes Hospital. 
3 A seventh complaint was filed against the University of 
Pennsylvania Medical Center and related entities, see No. 09-
cv-5547; that case later settled. 
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(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq.4; and the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq.  Less than one week later, the same 
individual plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Philadelphia County, alleging that the Policies violated the 
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law 
(“PWPCL”), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 260.3, et seq.; the 
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”), 43 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 333.101, et seq.; and Pennsylvania common law. 
 
The defendants timely removed six of the seven state 
court actions to federal court, on the basis that several of the 
claims were completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1), 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1), and supplemental jurisdiction existed 
over the remaining claims because they formed part of the 
same case or controversy.  The Jefferson Health and Albert 
Einstein defendants additionally argued that the plaintiffs’ 
PWPCL and breach of contract claims were completely 
preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 
(“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185.  The District Court denied the 
plaintiffs’ motions to remand on September 15, 2010, holding 
that ERISA preempted the state claims “in full” and LMRA § 
301 completely preempted the plaintiffs’ PWPCL and breach 
of contract claims.  App. 193–99.  In the same order, the court 
consolidated each of the state cases with its federal 
counterpart and directed the plaintiffs to file consolidated 
complaints.   
 
The plaintiffs filed amended complaints on October 
15, 2010, averring, as before,  that the defendants:  denied 
them overtime in violation of the FLSA; failed to keep 
accurate records and breached their fiduciary duties in 
violation of ERISA; and, in so doing, violated RICO.  The 
amended complaints also reasserted all of the state law 
claims.  The District Court granted the defendants’ joint 
motions to dismiss in a consolidated opinion.  It found that 
the amended complaints did not plausibly allege that the 
                                              
4 The plaintiffs’ ERISA claims were:  failure to keep accurate 
records sufficient to determine benefits in violation of 
ERISA’s recordkeeping provision under 29 U.S.C. § 
1059(a)(1) (ERISA § 209(a)(1)); and breach of fiduciary duty 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (ERISA § 404(a)(1)). 
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defendants were the plaintiffs’ employers and thus failed to 
state claims under the FLSA or ERISA.  It also dismissed the 
RICO claims, on the ground that the complaints did not 
adequately allege the predicate act of mail fraud.  Further, it 
“decline[d] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the 
state law claims.  App. 54.  The court granted the plaintiffs 
leave to amend, but cautioned them to “remedy the gaping 
deficiencies” observed by it and other district courts that have 
dismissed substantially similar complaints.  App. 55 & nn.70–
72 (citing cases).  In particular, the plaintiffs were instructed 
to “clari[fy]” whether they were also seeking gap time wages.  
App. 49 n.49. 
 
After the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint 
in each case, the parties stipulated to the filing of third 
amended complaints.  The third amended complaints, which 
were filed on February 10, 2012, abandoned the ERISA and 
RICO claims and instead sought relief solely under the FLSA 
and Pennsylvania law.  The defendants moved to dismiss, and 
the District Court granted their motions in another 
consolidated opinion.  The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
FLSA claims with prejudice5 on the grounds that they failed 
to plausibly allege employer-employee relationships between 
the plaintiffs and all of the defendants, or that any of the 
named plaintiffs had worked overtime and were not 
compensated.  The court again “decline[d] to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state law 
claims, which it dismissed without prejudice to their 
reassertion in state court.  App. 7, 72.  The plaintiffs timely 
appealed “each and every part of this final order,” including 
the District Court’s September 15, 2010 orders denying their 
motions to remand the state cases to the Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas.  App. 8. 
 
II. 
  
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 
we exercise jurisdiction over the District Court’s dismissal of 
                                              
5 The court also specifically denied the plaintiffs leave to 
amend their third amended complaints. 
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those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.6  Our review over 
a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) is plenary.  Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 
116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks 
omitted).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Id.  Though “detailed factual 
allegations” are not required, a complaint must do more than 
simply provide “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
 
A. 
 
                                              
6 In addition to appealing the District Court’s dismissal of 
their FLSA claims, the plaintiffs appealed from (and the 
parties’ briefs discuss at length) the District Court’s order 
denying the plaintiffs’ motions to remand the state cases on 
the basis that they were completely preempted by ERISA § 
502(a) and LMRA § 301.  We need not rule on whether the 
court’s preemption ruling was correct because the issue is 
moot in light of the District Court’s later orders — which the 
defendants do not challenge — dismissing all of the state law 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We further express no 
opinion as to whether the plaintiffs’ state law claims are 
preempted by ERISA § 514(a), which provides, in relevant 
part, that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added); see 
Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 355 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“Removal and preemption are two distinct concepts.” 
(quotation marks omitted)); see also N.J. Carpenters & the 
Trs. Thereof v. Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.J., --- F.3d ---, 
2014 WL 3702591, at *3 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Complete 
preemption under § 502(a) is a jurisdictional concept, 
whereas express preemption under § 514 is a substantive 
concept governing the applicable law.” (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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 The plaintiffs first argue that the defendants did not 
compensate them for hours worked in excess of forty per 
week during meal breaks, at training programs, and outside of 
their scheduled shifts.  The District Court found that the 
plaintiffs’ overtime claim was factually inadequate, on the 
ground that, “[t]he abundance of allegations 
notwithstanding,” the plaintiffs “failed to allege a single 
specific instance in which a named Plaintiff worked overtime 
and was not compensated for this time.”  App. 70, 72 n.65.  
On appeal, the plaintiffs insist that “[n]othing in Twombly or 
Iqbal” requires them to plead the exact dates and times that 
they worked overtime.  Plaintiffs’ Br. 27. 
 
“The FLSA establishes federal minimum-wage, 
maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be 
modified by contract.”  Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. 
Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013).  Generally, an 
employer must pay its employees at least a specified 
minimum hourly wage for work performed, 29 U.S.C. § 206, 
and must pay one and one-half times the employer’s regular 
wage for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, id. 
§ 207.  Employers who violate these provisions are “liable to 
the employee or employees affected in the amount of their 
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime 
compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal 
amount as liquidated damages.”  Id. § 216(b).  Thus, to 
recover overtime compensation under the FLSA, “an 
employee must prove that he worked overtime hours without 
compensation, and he must show the amount and extent of his 
overtime work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.”  
Davis v. Food Lion, 792 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 
687 (1946)). 
 
The level of detail necessary to plead a FLSA overtime 
claim poses a more difficult question — one that has “divided 
courts around the country.”  Nakahata v. N.Y.–Presbyterian 
Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 200 (2d Cir. 2013).  
Some courts have required plaintiffs to allege approximately 
the number of hours worked for which wages were not 
received.  See, e.g., Jones v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, 538 F. 
Supp. 2d 1094, 1102–03 (S.D. Iowa 2008) (holding that a 
complaint alleging that the plaintiffs “regularly worked 
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regular time and overtime each week but were not paid 
regular and overtime wages” was “implausible on its face” 
(quotation marks omitted)).  Other courts have adopted a 
more lenient approach, holding that, “[w]hile Defendants 
might appreciate having Plaintiffs’ estimate of the overtime 
hours worked at [the pleading stage],” a FLSA complaint will 
survive dismissal so long as it alleges that the employee 
worked more than forty hours in a week and did not receive 
overtime compensation.  Butler v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 800 
F. Supp. 2d 662, 668 (D. Md. 2011).   
 
We agree with the middle-ground approach taken by 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Lundy v. 
Catholic Health System of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106 (2d 
Cir. 2013).  In Lundy, the court held that “in order to state a 
plausible FLSA overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently 
allege [forty] hours of work in a given workweek as well as 
some uncompensated time in excess of the [forty] hours.”  Id. 
at 114 (emphases added) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) 
(requiring that, “for a workweek longer than forty hours,” an 
employee who works “in excess of” forty hours shall be 
compensated time and a half for the excess hours)). 
 
Similar to the plaintiffs here, the plaintiffs in Lundy 
alleged that their employers, a collection of hospitals, 
healthcare providers, and related entities, failed to 
compensate them adequately for time worked during breaks, 
outside of scheduled shifts, and during required training 
sessions.  Id. at 109.  Plaintiff Patricia Wolman “typically” 
worked 37.5 hours per week, “occasionally” worked an 
additional 12.5-hour or “slightly longer” shift, and was not 
compensated for, inter alia, work done during thirty-minute 
meal breaks (which were “typically” missed or interrupted) or 
outside of her scheduled shifts (“typically” an extra fifteen 
minutes per shift).  Id. at 114–15 (quotation marks omitted).  
The court held that Wolman failed to state a claim for 
overtime because, while her allegations could “theoretically” 
put her over the forty-hour mark “in one or another 
unspecified week (or weeks),” they “suppl[ied] nothing but 
low-octane fuel for speculation” as to that conclusion.  Id. at 
115.  Plaintiff Kelly Iwasiuk similarly averred that she 
“typically” worked thirty hours per week, worked extra shifts 
totaling between 37.5 and forty-five hours “approximately 
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twice a month,” and was not compensated for, inter alia, work 
done during meal breaks or outside of her scheduled shifts.  
Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Like Wolman, Iwasiuk “d[id] 
not allege that she was denied overtime pay in a week where 
she worked . . . additional shifts.”  Id.  The court therefore 
held that Iwasiuk’s allegations were similarly implausible.  
Id. 
 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a 
“plausible” claim contains “factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  
Because Wolman and Iwasiuk each failed to allege “a single 
workweek in which [she] worked at least [forty] hours and 
also worked uncompensated time in excess of [forty] hours,” 
they did not satisfy this standard, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the FLSA overtime 
claims.  Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114–15. 
 
In the present case, each named plaintiff alleges that he 
or she “typically” worked shifts totaling between thirty-two 
and forty hours per week and further alleges that he or she 
“frequently” worked extra time.  For instance, Collette Davis 
“typically” worked the 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. shift five days 
per week, totaling forty hours, exclusive of the 2.5 hours 
deducted from her pay for meal periods (during which she 
“frequently” worked), the one to two hours she worked after 
her shift, and the twenty hours of annual continuing education 
units she was required to complete.  App. 820–21.  Because 
they “typically worked full time, or very close to it” and “also 
worked several hours of unpaid work each week,” Plaintiffs’ 
Br. 24, the plaintiffs surmise that “[i]t [is] certainly plausible 
that at least some of the uncompensated work was performed 
during weeks when the plaintiffs[’] total work time was more 
than forty hours,” Plaintiffs’ Br. 27.  We disagree.   
 
Determining whether a plausible claim has been pled 
is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”  Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 679.  None of the named plaintiffs has alleged a 
single workweek in which he or she worked at least forty 
hours and also worked uncompensated time in excess of forty 
hours.  Of the four named plaintiffs who allege that they 
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“typically” worked at least forty hours per week, in addition 
to extra hours “frequently” worked during meal breaks or 
outside of their scheduled shifts — Davis, Erica Williams, 
Gerardina Ilaria, and Diane Read — none indicates that she in 
fact worked extra hours during a typical (that is, a forty-hour) 
week.  Their allegations are therefore insufficient.  See, e.g., 
Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114 (“[I]n order to state a plausible FLSA 
overtime claim, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege [forty] 
hours of work in a given workweek as well as some 
uncompensated time in excess of the [forty] hours.” 
(emphases added)); see also Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 201 (citing 
Lundy and holding that “[p]laintiffs must provide sufficient 
detail about the length and frequency of their unpaid work to 
support a reasonable inference that they worked more than 
forty hours in a given week”). 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not hold that a 
plaintiff must identify the exact dates and times that she 
worked overtime.  For instance, a plaintiff’s claim that she 
“typically” worked forty hours per week, worked extra hours 
during such a forty-hour week, and was not compensated for 
extra hours beyond forty hours he or she worked during one 
or more of those forty-hour weeks, would suffice.7  But no 
such allegation is present in this case.   
                                              
7 In Manning v. Boston Medical Center Corp., 725 F.3d 34 
(1st Cir. 2013), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
considered allegations that the plaintiffs were scheduled to 
work forty hours per week “regularly,” “approximately once a 
month,” and “at least once a year.”  Id. at 46 (quotation marks 
omitted).  Because “[a]ny time that they worked during meal 
breaks, before or after their shifts, and in training periods, 
would thus entitle them to overtime compensation,” the court 
held that the allegations stated a FLSA overtime claim under 
the Lundy standard.  Id. at 46–47.  Admittedly, unlike the 
plaintiffs in Manning, and certain of the named plaintiffs in 
this case, none of the plaintiffs in Lundy alleged that they 
typically worked, at a minimum, forty hours per week.  
However, we do not interpret Lundy to hinge on the absence 
of such allegations.  Instead, we read the decision to hold that 
a plaintiff must connect the dots between bare allegations of a 
“typical” forty-hour workweek and bare allegations of work 
completed outside of regularly scheduled shifts, so that the 
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Accordingly, the District Court did not err in 
dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for overtime under the 
FLSA. 
 
B. 
 
The plaintiffs also challenge the District Court’s 
determination that their claims for gap time are not within the 
FLSA’s purview. 
 
In addition to seeking unpaid overtime compensation, 
employees may seek to recover wages for uncompensated 
hours worked that “fall between the minimum wage and the 
overtime provisions of the FLSA,” otherwise known as “gap 
time.”  Adair v. City of Kirkland, 185 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th 
Cir. 1999).  Gap time 
 
refers to time that is not covered by the 
overtime provisions because it does not exceed 
the overtime limit, and to time that is not 
covered by the minimum wage provisions 
because, even though it is uncompensated, the 
employees are still being paid a minimum wage 
when their salaries are averaged across their 
actual time worked. 
 
Id. at 1062 n.6.  In other words, “gap time” is non-overtime 
hours worked for which an employee is not compensated.  
Because an employee has a sufficiently high hourly rate, 
when all compensated and non-compensated hours are 
divided into the weekly pay, the employee’s average hourly 
pay still exceeds the FLSA minimum. 
 
Courts widely agree that there is no cause of action 
under the FLSA for “pure” gap time wages — that is, wages 
for unpaid work during pay periods without overtime.  See, 
e.g., Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 201 (“[T]he FLSA is unavailing 
                                                                                                     
allegations concerning a typical forty-hour week include an 
assertion that the employee worked additional hours during 
such a week, and we believe that this middle-ground 
approach is the correct one. 
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where wages do not fall below the statutory minimum and 
hours do not rise above the overtime threshold.”); Monahan v. 
Cnty. of Chesterfield, Va., 95 F.3d 1263, 1280 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(same).  However, some courts have recognized as viable gap 
time claims by an employee who exceeds the overtime 
threshold, but whose employment contract does not 
compensate him or her for all non-overtime hours (“overtime 
gap time”).  See, e.g., Monahan, 95 F.3d at 1272–73; Valcho 
v. Dallas Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 658 F. Supp. 2d 802, 811–12 
(N.D. Tex. 2009); Koelker v. Mayor & City Council of 
Cumberland, 599 F. Supp. 2d 624, 635 (D. Md. 2009); cf., 
e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 778.315, 778.317, 778.322. 
 
As an initial matter, we agree with the clear weight of 
authority and hold that pure gap time claims — straight time 
wages for unpaid work during pay periods without overtime 
— are not cognizable under the FLSA, which requires 
payment of minimum wages and overtime wages only.  See 
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19.  The District Court therefore correctly 
found that, “[t]o the extent Plaintiffs seek recovery under the 
FLSA for hours worked but not compensated below the 
[forty]-hour weekly threshold . . . the FLSA does not provide 
[them] the remedy they seek.”  App. 69 (emphasis added); see 
also App. 845, 1469, 1655, 2330–31, 3259 (alleging that the 
plaintiffs “regularly worked hours both under and in excess of 
[forty] per week and were not paid for all of those hours” 
(emphasis added)).  The court did not address, however, the 
possibility that the plaintiffs’ gap time claims might constitute 
claims for “overtime gap time.”  We need not resolve the 
issue in this case because, as discussed above, the plaintiffs 
have not plausibly alleged that they worked overtime in any 
given week.8  The District Court’s order dismissing the third 
amended complaints will therefore be affirmed.  
                                              
8 The District Court additionally found that the plaintiffs’ 
third amended complaints did not plausibly allege that an 
employer-employee relationship existed between certain of 
the defendants and the named plaintiffs.  See, e.g., App. 65–
68.  Having concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a 
plausible claim for overtime against any of the defendants, we 
need not address this issue.  We also need not address the 
defendants’ argument that the Meal Break Deduction policy 
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C. 
 
 The plaintiffs finally contend that the District Court 
erred in denying them another opportunity to amend the 
complaint.  We review for abuse of discretion.  Krantz v. 
Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 
2002).   
 In its September 8, 2011 opinion dismissing the 
amended complaint, the District Court emphasized that any 
repleaded allegations would have to remedy the “gaping 
deficiencies” identified by “at least seven other district 
courts” that had dismissed similar complaints filed by the 
same counsel.  App. 55 & n.70.  “A District Court has 
discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the 
plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies in his 
complaint, but chose not to resolve them.”  Krantz, 305 F.3d 
at 144.  Because the plaintiffs were on notice as to the 
deficiencies of their complaints, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiffs leave to file a 
fourth amended complaint. 
 
III. 
 
  For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s orders 
will be affirmed. 
 
                                                                                                     
does not, as a matter of law, violate the FLSA.  See 
Defendants’ Br. 35–42. 
